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The coconut industry has long been one of the largest users of
agricultural land and labor in the Philippines. Being a major source
of income for k rural population, it has, by its performance, been
generally regarded as a predictor for general economic activity. Coconut
exports have also been one of the country's major foreign exchange
earners. The Philippines has been the top producer and exporter of
coconut products in the world.
With such importance, the industry and the government policies in
it are the focus of a public discussion as coconut farmers weather the
current period of low coconut prices since 1980. When there is a proli-
feration of government policies in the industry in the context of an
unprecedentedly prolonged period of low prices, there is the compelling
suggestion for causation. Relative to earlier years, the government
has intervened more heavily in the industry in the last decade with
Paper presented at the Workshop on The Impact of Economic Policies
on Agricultural Development sponsored, jointly by the Philippine Institute
of Development Studies (PIDS) andthe Philippine Council for Agriculture
and Resources Research and Development (PCARRD) on March 25-26, 1983,
Tagaytay City.
**
Research Intern, East-West Resource Systems Institute, and
Professor, University of Hawaii.
the export tax, the coconut ].:_Jes, t.he o_tabl, isbment of the United
Coconut Oil, Mills (UN]COM), the coco,Jut replanti.g scheme and other
related programs,
One of the issues to surface in this d:i.scuss_on has been wl',ether
the CCSF levy, the largest tax on the industry in its entire history,
has depressed farm prices (UCAP, 1979). Another has been whether the
UN]COM, being the largest oil mj [li,,g company of the country today, has
also helped to .lower these price:_. Proponents of the CCSF levy cite
the benefits offered by the progrnms funded by it. Foremost is the
replanting program aiming for ;] (] ram;_ t: i (' .increase _n the country's
coconut productivity. Some of the C(7SF rev,.,nue ha_s also been used to
subsidize since 1973 cooking o_l and otl,(..rror_mu£-based consumer
products. The UNICOM itself and its owu,,r, the 11_i_ed Coconut Planters
Bank, were purchased out of the CCSF r_,w.,n,u,.
While indeed governme_-)L [nit,front i,n_ i,_ {h,- iudu._try has increased
during the 1970s, there is hardly :,my au;,ivt ic ,,.:rudyof" it._ economic
impacts. It- in t;ri.spaper's prim;irv purpo:_, to fi I| ti_._ gap.
The CCSF levy and the export .tax drive a wedge between border and
producer prices of copra. Th-i_ wc'dgt, i_ ;_ppnr,,ni!v wi(hq%t.,dby govern-
merit policies that limit compet'iri(.,), l.ower pri_'.es f_)r (,(,pra producers
in turn are a source of l)rote(:tion for It,,,, I.'{llI_l_r_/l: ; ('l'l/'(}l}llt Oil, mills.
The direct benefits to farm,.rs from ll;ivi._.., t!*,. CCSF levy .'.r_. relatively
small a.d not widely availablv.
After giving an ow-,rv.iew (,1" thp coco,nil inrlusl rv (.qect'i.on 1). we
describe the major government poli.cies nrft.eting the industry (Section 2)
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and present summary statistics which are indicative of the economic
effects of these policies. The primary indicators are nominal and
effective protection rates (Sections 3 and 4). This is followed by a
discussion on the CCSF levy, its revenue and its benefits. We also
discuss the replanting program, the vertical integration program, and
ownership of the United Coconut Planters Bank and the UNICOM (Section 5).
In section 6, we measure the domestic resource cost (DRC) of copra
production per unit of foreign exchange earned in the major coconut regions
- (Section 6), The results in Section 4, 5, and 6 will be
summed up in Section 7_,where we also attempt to provide directions for
policy reforms.
I. The Coconut Industr_
I.I. An Overview
Generally, the industry is made up of three sectors: production,
trading and processing. Figure i il|ustrates the interrelationship among
the three in the marketing channe]s of coconut products. Copra and nuts
are the main products in the production sector. In 1980, for example,
about 15.93 billion nuts were gathered by coconut farmers. Out of this,
over 90 percent was processed into co|)r;_,an input in cocosut oil
milling, while the rest was utilized to produ<:e dessicated coconut.
Small farmers make up the production sector. Of the rough19 half
a million coconut farms reported ii_ the 1970 census, about three
quarters had a size under five (5) hectares. The average farm size was
_4--,
2.4 hectares. About '18 percent of t-he rota! product:ion in t980 was
•consumed locally, Tile remaining 82 percent was exported mainly to the
United States and Europe.
From the production sector, the coconut products flow to their
u,qers through the trading sector made up of town and barrio buyers. The
users of these products are primarily the oi'.],millers/exporters, copra
exporters and dessicators/exporter._. The oii m£11,ers also produce
copra cake/pellets or copra meal, a by-product in miIZing. A few mills
refine the crude coconut oil to produce cooking oi]. and other coconut-
based consumer products for domestic consumption. Other users are the
manufacturer_ and exporters of coco-chemlca1:;, charcoal and activated
carbon and coir, Together they make up the processing sector of the
industry,
Figure I.
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in 1980, the industry was the third largest user of land next to rice and
corn. Coconut farmland was 3.13 mill_on hectares or 25 p_r'cent of the entire
eultlvated area. A total of 420 u_lllon cocor_t tr'ee._ had been plmnted, 82
percent of which were bearing,
The total production of these farad) wa,_ 15.93 i,illion nut_, equivalent to
about 3.9 million metric tons of copra. Their value was _9.3 bill_on. Thus,
coconuts were the top contrlbut(_, among all crops to the r_tlotsl income of
about _215.2 bllllon (1980 prices).
Next to minsral products, coconut export._ were the second blggest foreign
exchange earners of the country. Their value was UZ$820.5 uLi]llon, represent-
1rig 14.2 percent of the value of total merchandi._e exports In 1980.
The utllizatlon of coconuts is described lr_ Figure 2. Of the total
produotlon in 1980, 71.1 percent was exported as coconut oli and copra meal; 6
percent as copra; and 6.7 percent as dee:_icated cocoz_t. The rest wa_ consumed
locally as manufactured oll (12.2 yercent), homemade oll (1.5 percent), and
foodnuts (2.5 percent).
Table I presents the geo_aphlcal dlstrltution of the industry. About
half of the total farm area and approximately 42 percent of the total stock of
coconut trees were in Mlndanao in 1980. The tr_e density in Central Vlsayas
was relatively hlgher than in the rest of the country. In terms of y_el_, the
national average was 46 nuts _r bearlng tree. The bulk of coconut oli mills
and deesloatlng plants was In Luzon, especially in Metro M_nila and Southern
Tagalog.
Figure 2.
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1.3. Patterns of.Changes in the industry
Increasing rates of growth in area planted and stock of trees were
observed from the 1950s to the 1960s (Table 2). As a result, coconut
output was also growing at an accelerating rate fr_ 2.1 percent in 1960s
to 7 percent during the last decade. Normally, the gestation period for
coconuts is about 7 years. However, the growth of area planted and trees
apparently slowed down in the 1970s.
The growth rate of production is apparently explained more by the growth
rates of area planted and trees rather than that of productivity. The growth
rate of yield was constant at about 2.7 percent (discounting the negative
growth rate in the 1960s) while production was growing at an increasing rate.
In trade, coconut oil exports recorded the most impressive rate of
increase both in volume and value. Recovering from their decline in the
second half of the 1950s, they increased at an average annual rate of 25.5
percent per year during the last two decades. For copra exports, the rate
of growth was steady at 5 percent per year for the same period. But their
capability to generate foreign exchange appeared to have been eroded in the
1970s when the growth rate of their value dropped to 0.3 percent.
Copra and coconut oil have been the main foreign exchange earners among
coconut products. There was a significant shift in the export-product
mix from the leadership of copra in the 1950s and 1960s to the dominance
of coconut oil during the last decade. This implies an intensification
of coconut processing in the country in the same period.
-1C,_
Table 2.
.'Growth tlates and Some CtmnBes
In The Coconut Industry: 1955 - 1980
(In percent)
......................................... ;;;-;;;1955-1960 1961-1970 I
Growth Rates =
Area PZanted 0.8 m 6LO 5.0
Total Trees 2.0 = 5.0 _,0
Coconut Produotion 2.8 m 2.1 7.0
Yield 2.6 m - 2,0 2,8
Volume of Exports:
Coconut Oil -0._ 25.0 2_,0
Copra 2.0 5,0 5 • 0
Dessioated Coconut 8.0 8.0 5.0
Copra Heal 2.0 3,0 10.0
Value of Exports:
Coconut Oil 3.0 27.0 30.0
Copra 3.0 _.0 0.3
Dessleated Coconut 10.0 J_.0 31.0
Copra Meal 3.0 20.0 20.0
Share in Total Export Values:
Coconut Oil 11.0 24.0 5_.0
Copra 77.0 6 1.0 29.0
Dessicat.ed Coconut 9.0 9.0 9.0
Copra Meal 3.0 6.0 8:0
Un_te_ States ITS.0 51.0 _I .0
Europe ,4.0 43.0 43.0
Others 8.0 6.0 16.0
m AveraKe of ten years (1951-1960).
Source: Basic data drawn t'rom Phillppln_, Coconut Authority and BAECON,
Ministry of AEriculture (fur Area Flanted and Trees).
The United States and Europe have been the =aJur t_yers o£ the
country's coconut products. The country had apparently d_verslfied
its markets durin8 the last decade, as shown by the increase in the
share of the rest o£ the wurld to total export value from 6 to 16
percent. The new markets fur cocom_t products included the Soviet
Union and Chtrm.
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l._ Prices
Fluctuating incomes of coconut fePmers are characteristic of the industry.
Thls Is illustrated in Figure 3 which illustrates world and
domestic prices of vegetable oils and oilseeds from 1955 to 1980. In the lower
part of the figure, domestic prices of copra and coconut oli, given in pesos
pep metric ton, fluctuated considerably.
The upper part of the figure shows the plot of world prices of soybean
oil, Ooeo_t oil, palm oil, copra and palm kernel (in US dollars per metric
ton). It is interesting to note how these prlees moved so closely with one
another. This illustrates how these oils are close substltutes _one another
- a finding relevant fur the elasticity issue discus_ed in Section 3. Because
of this and the fact that coconut oil oonstltutes only about 5.8 percent of the
entire w_Id pr_duoKion of food oils and fats in the last decade [UCAP, 1981],
%
the world d_and for Philippine coconut ell is likely to be hlghly elastic.
The price peaks in 1974 and 1979 were rather unusual. During both
periods t acute shortages of the _aj_ food oils and fats in the world followed
&
weather-induced shortfall in their supply. The price Increases in OPEC ell
during these years aUJ-ava%ed the situation. Vegetable oils, like coconut oil,
are substitutes fc_ mineral oil in their non-food uses, e.g., produotlon of
chemicals. Accordingly, sOme swltching to these from mineral ell must have
been caused by the high OPEC prices, thereby further increasing their prloes.
It was during the first price peak (which started in 1973) that the
government intervened with the CCSF levy and the subsidy progrem..Ttmae were
the poliCy responses to the dlsappearanoe of edible ell from the market. We
will elaborate on this in the next section where we discuss the policies that
have affected the industry.
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Before the 1970s, the economic policies affecting the Industry were
general An scope. The import controls in Lhe 1950s and the decontrol progrnm
and the consequent retention scheme in the 1960s were overall economic policies
for these years. Except for two insignificant industry tazes,i there were
hardly any Induatry-speclflc policies. In contrast, more of the latter were
decreed during the 1970s.
Another di£terenoe in the policy pattern during these periods was in the
eztent of taxation. Relative to earlier years, there were a_cre and heavier
explicit taxes on the industry in the last decade. With this as an overview,
we present chronologlcally the Important policies which have affected the
industry.
2.1. sefore the  70s
The system oi*import controls in the 1950s_ which in effect undervalued
foralgn exchange, Implicitly taxed exports in general. The exporters lost
by the dit/erenoe between t_e free market and offlcal values of their foreign
exchange earnXngs. Thus, exporters had ant incentive to understate their
export volume in order to avoid this implicit export tax.2
A better picture emerged in the 1960s wlth the decontrol program and the
gradual devaluation of the peso. However, implicit taxation on export8 in
1 These taxes were authorized to be collected in 195q and 1955, respectively,
in order to finance the Ph£11pplne Coconut Administration. Together, their'
rate was eI.50 per m.t. copra.
2 Some evidence supporting this can be fc_nd in Darrah and Tion_on [1969],
se_mrel eontlm_ed with the .-ete=_tlon scheme policy of the Central Bank. Under
this scheme, exporter= were allowed to retain a portion of their fceelgn
exchange revenue that they could sell at free market rates. The rest, however,
were to be exchanged at the lower offlclal rates, constituting a tax on their
exports. Thls scheme was lifted An 1965 [Power and Slcat].3
2'2 the
The floating rate policy in 1970 ushered in explicit taxation on exports
in pnoral. Largely in order to siphon off the windfall profits gained by
exporters with the devaluation of the peso, the government through Republic Act
r
(RA) 6165 explloit1_ taxa(__aJor exports in general. The tax was assessed on
the f.o.b, value of exports.
The Or_£_l plan in 1970 was to lower its rate every year until It would
have been phased out in 197_. Bowever, Presidential Decree (PD) 230 made
export taxatlon a Permanent policy of the government in 1973 [Yoln_o and
Qulntos]. The decree aAao fixed the rate of the tax at 6 percent fer copr_ _
percent far processed coconut products, as shown in Table 3.
3 Another general polloy to note was embodied in the bilateral Laurel-Langley
agreement between the Philippines and the United States. _tartlng 19_t
oooozpat ell and copra meal exports to the US, provided they were within
qUota IAmlta, were exempted from US duties. The agreement explred in 197_.
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Table 3
The CCSF Levy and Export Tax Rates on Coconut Products: 1970-1981
(pesos/mr copra)
CCSF Levy
Period Actual Average* Percent Copra Proceed
Covered Rate Rate of Export Exports Coconut
Year Levy Price Exports
1970 .... I0 8
1971 .... 8 6
1972 .... 6 4
1973 8/10 - 12/14 150 60 4 6 4
12/15 - 12/31 250
1974 I/i - i/i0 250 770 21 6 4
I/II - 5/23 550
5/24--11/5 1000
1975 i/I - I/I0 700 350 21 6 4
1/11 - 5118 400
5119 -12/31 300
1976 i/I - 12/31 300 300 20 6 4
1977 1/1 - 3/15 300 530 21 6 4
1978 3/16 -12/31 600
1979 1/I -12/31 600 600 13 7.5 4
1980 i/i - 5/27 600 700 24 3* 2*
5/28 - 7/12 suspended
7/13 -12/_I I000"*
1981 i/I- 9/9 i000"* 800 31 lifted lifted
9/10-10/2 lifted
10/3 -12/31 500
* weighted average..
** on exported copra only.
Source: Philippine Coconut Authority
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Another purpose of the export tax was to promote forward integration.
Th_p proces_d exports were taxed two-percentage points lower than other
exports. Xn 1979, the rate f_ copra was increased to 7.5 percent thereby
increasing thla differential. In 1980, the tax on coconut exports was llfted
due to low coconut prices.
2.2.2._e _ Levy
In 1971, RA 6260 was passed whereby a fixed levy was to be collected from
coconut producers for a period o_ ten years starting '1972. Called the COCO_ND
levy, this tax was fixed at the rate of _5.50 per metric ton (st) of copra and
was to be utilized to underwrite the Cocormt Investment Company._ This
company was to become the instrument whereby coconut producers could invest in
the processing and trading of their products. To establish the ownership of
this oompany, COCO_ND receipts were issued to cocotmt farmers upon payment of
the levy during the sale of their products. These receipts were to be
converted to shares of stock of the company,
\
Despite Its small magnitude, the COCOFUND levy was significant An the
1970s because of its idea of vertical integration, _.e. farmers going into the
business of trading and processing of their products, and due to the COCOFUND
receipts. It helped shape the nature of the most important production levy on
the industry in its entire hiatopy, the CCSF levy.
Z.2.3. _ CCSF_.V.y5
The government collects the tax directly from copra uaere, who in turn
deduct the tax £rom their buying prices far oopra. In ot_ler words, the price
received by the farmers is the market price of copra at the farm _ess the
COCOFUND levT. This same collection procedure is followed far the CCSF levy.
5 For a more detailed disousalon on the history of the COCOFUND and CCSF
levies, see David, 1977; UCAP, 1979; Clar_te, 1980.
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As stated above, the abrupt increase of coconut prices in 1973 led to the
imposition of the CCSF ].evy. Since the cost of cocom_t inputs had gor_ up, the
prices of basic coco-based consumer products rose slgnlflcantly, T_iegovern-
ment then Imposed prloe ceilings fee- these products which led to their
dlsappearanoe _om the market. Producers lost heavily in supplying the
products st controlled prices while input prices continued to soar "by the
day m. To remedy the situation, the government subsidized the producers fc_
thelr losses with funds coming from a new levy on coconut productlon. Thus, PD
276 (Table 4) imposed the _SF levy on August I0, 1973 for this purpose. It
set the rate iD£tlal_ at D150 per mt of copra, subject to change depending
upon the fundlr4_ requlr_ent of the subsidy program. It further decreed that
the levy was to be rescinded after one year or after _e duration of the
cooking oll oriels; wh£ohever was earlier.
In 1974, however, PD 41_ was issued to continue the levy thereby voldinE
the provlaloDj ot PD 27_. The farmero added two new u.-_s of the levy: to pay
fOr about 90 percent of the premium duty and to allocate some funds l'or the
Phlllppli_ Cooomtt Authority (PCA) to invest.
The premium duty was imposed in 197_ by Executive Order No. 425 to
capture the windfall i_Lins m_de by coconut exporters from any favorable market
situatlons. The duty was assessed on the dlfferem-e between the customs
valuation of all exports and their res_ectlve b_se prices, as set by the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). The tax rates were 30 percent
for copra and 20 percent for processed coconut products. This duty was lifted
in 1980, at the same time that the export tax was rescinded.
In a bid to increase coconut productivity, PD 582 w_ issued towards the
end of 1974 to launch the national program to replant the country's coconut
,t
farms with a oooomat hybrid. It crested the Coconut industry Development Fund
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(CIDF) for the Purpose. The CCSF levy way the instrument to raise revenue for
this fund.
In 1975, the PhilipplrwsCoconut Authcrlty (PCA) was allowed under PD 755,
glven out that year, to purchase, in behalf bf the _ocor_t farmers, the First
Unlteo Bank. The oapltal it used in this venture wa_ part of the funds alloted
to it for investments under PD 41q. TI_ bank bec_me known aS the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The |ercent o£ equity held by the PCA in UCFB
fop the coconut farmers in general was 70 percent. To glve this Percent to the
farmersp the PCA ruled that only those who owned COCOPdND recolpts would be
eligible to own shapes of stock in the bank. Ac_ordlngly, for each peso o£
COCOFUND reoeipts, the PCA gave to the owner three sharee_"with a par value
of it.e0 each.
The UCFB beome now the principal instrument by which coconut farmers
could invest in pr_cesslng and trading of thelr',products. This was in
accordance with the vertlcal integration progPsm of the government for the
£ndtlstry_ as spelled out in the COCOFUND law, RA 6260, and in PD 232 in 197].
But the most expllelt statement for this pr_gr_ was given by the Revised
Coconut Industry Code, PD I_68, in 1978. To give the program more funds, PD
Iq68 created the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) again through the
instrumentality of the CCSF levy. The CIIF has been _._nagedby the UCFB.
By 1979, 0CPB had bought out, with the CIIF, almo._ttwo-thlrd_ of the
country's total rated milling oepaolty. The newly aoqulrcd m£11s were
consolidated under ore company, the UNICOf4,with government authorization and
full support, This veorganlzatlon contrasts dr_atloally w_th the.eompet_tlve
history of the country,s milling business. The .events leading to this
development can be partially attPibuted to some faulty plannlng on the part o£
the Board o£ Investments (BOI). Based on misplaced optim£_ abou_ future copra
"1g-
supply, the BOI continued in the second hal# of the last decade to grant
incentives to investors in coconut ell mill_ng until the milling business was
overQrowded. The rated capacity exceeded by over a million tons the available
Qopra supply. This, in turn, led to a tight competition for copra mong Xt_
users. The problem was highlighted in 1979 when some o£ the new ell aLlls
closed down. The sovernment intervened shortly _ereafter with Letter of
InstrUction (LOI) 926, the content of which will be discussed shortly.
Follovtng a sharp decline _n cocor_t prices in 1980, the CC3F levy was
suspended on May 27p 1980 to resume _5 days thereafter, as provided in PD 1699.
Upon Lts resumption, _t reoeAved a new frame, Coconut Development Project Fund.
An inAtlal levy of _600 per metric ton wa_ collected during the copra' s first
domestic sale, unless the product is destlned _'_-domestic consumptlon (which
the user had to declare). An addlttoral #400 was to be paid by the exporters
when they applied tar export clearance. Thus, the new levy was rouEhly
equivalent to an expOrt tax oi" _I000.
In 1981, the CCSF levy was lifted f_ about a month. When it was
relnt_odunedt its name was changed £cr the second tlme to the Coconut Industry
StabAlizatlon Fund (CZSF). In the first quarter of 1982, its rate became
variable depending upOn the level of coconut prices, according to a specified
sohedttle; thust the name "sliding Ievy".6
6 The sliding levy rates can be Econd in Far Eastern Economic Review, February
12, 1982 issue. It also cme to our knowledge that the export tax was
reintroduced in 1982. Other uses of the CC_F levy not covered In this
sootier 8_el 1)The Coconut Farmers Refund, f_r the 1LEe Lnsuranoe progPms
£or the OooOrn't £al_erej 2)The Scholarship Fund t whloh the chAldren oF the
faa38er8 carl warm on competitive basis; and 3)The Copra Price Stabilization
Fund, r_r Anventments An copra trading, also in accordance with the vertical
lnteKratAon proarl as the CXIF.
Table
THE LEC_ALBACKGROUMOOF THE (CST LEVY
I
i t .................Oecree/LOi/lmplementimj Orders Date Issued Title Important Provisions
P.D. Z76 Aug. 20, 1973 Establishing the Coconut Consumer It started the CCSF levy to effecL a price stabilization scheme
Stabilization Fund for coconut consumer products. Supervised by the Philippine
COCOnUtConsumer Stabilization Committee.
P.O. 414 April 18, 1974 Further Amen_in9 P.D. 232 As &_ended PCCSCabolist_d and function given to PCA. CCSF levy collections
were partly used for the vertical integration program and to absorb
the pr_eiu_ duty. o
P.D. 582 Nov. 14, 1974 Further Amendin9 P.D. 23Z As Amended Established the CIDF for the replantin_ program. A perm4_;ent lvvy
of PO.20/kilo from CCSIr levy rate plus initial CCSIr contril:ut!t:_.' nf
PlO0 _il lion.
P.D. 755 July 29, |975 Approvin? the Credit Policy ef the Approved the purchase of the First United Bank (o b,.tu_,_ _ht, _:;_,!
Coconut iflduStry as ReCome_.ndedby Coconut Plan_ers i_ank out of CCSF.
PCAand Providing Therefore
r'.D. iC'33 N:r_. 8, !_77 Institu_.ing a Procedure f_r tr,e I.-_p_i._itlv _e_la_ed t_at t_.e CCSr _s a s_eci_.,i _n_j :_d,Jc:,_r:. %,r._
_anagement of Special arid Fiduciary l
Funds H
o
P.D. ]46R June tl, 197El Revisecl C_conut Industry _,:__r_' r-,_.,,_ _e;,_, -'.._ed for '',_,0,-_,._C'n_ng_'_ " v_rt'_Ca _, ._te_r_le_t _; .' "% I
price $.e4h,:_ZaLfOn .'.c._eme "._c;_r_,l C_SF aS _riva:... ;sta_,-_,::i
C[!F, C,_conut F_r-_ers Pefuncl_ r'ror_:nted COCe,_[D Devei ,,':r:;.*_'_ ,t,_
PCAAd::_r;ist,-aL,;ve April ]9, _;9 i_l_eae_lT_. _.0. ,',_R. _,t-.*_Ii_he,_ ;'_e_ e_t_L.s_d_SC._:e_?.
Order NC. I Series
of 1979
LO| No. 85; May 4,,. 1979 Established the CPSF. Ai_,o.catesthe Sur._;_ of the.7;u,"SidyFund
t_-CllF. Sociai Arreliorat;onFund. an,,_CPSF at 24, 4,3,and 35
percent, resl)ectively.
LOT No. 9Z6 Sept. 3, ]g/g Rationalizationof the Coconut O:,l Establishedan_ gave._ul; ._,overn:_ent_upj.,nrtn _)fllC:i._..
Milling lfldus try
P.O. 1699 May _/, i9_O _rlACt Suspend|ng the Collect.ion of S,_;,en/.c-,; t_.._ ievy |or" .i_ .._.I.'_. _.___i,!TS:'!Pd thp C_i'_.
the CCSF Levy and Sir,:ilar Levies and
Providing in Connection Therewith
AppropriateMea_u,"estO CuShion the
Adverse Effects Thereof on the Coconut
Farmers
Sept. 9, 19P,1 The CESF le,-vw_s }ifte:l.*_-,,;" -;,si_tl._al,:C_s,onl)-to be re;,_po',e_
a ,,,._n_.n?,_,ter'. Nn fO,"'_,'-.aiPre_._,te,'l,.'._:;i i_ec,--eeha,F;FeL ;,e_n ;sxue,I.
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As stated above, _O1 926 outlined the goverrnnent's policy response to the
1979 crisis Of the country's oil mills. It authorized the creation of UNICON_
It instructed all relevant agencies of the government to give their full
support to the company. Furthermore, it problbited the establishment of new
oil mills as well as the expansion of existing ones wltbout the approval of the
PCA. We will refer to this in the succeeding discussion as the UNICOM policy.
This policy has two features. One is the eoncentratlon of coconut oil
mills in a single private company; the second is the restriction of the freedom
of entry into the milllnE business. Thus, the UNICOM has not only become the
largest seller of coeo_t oil, but also the biggest copra buyer in the country.
The overall polic,/, therefore, restricts competition in both copra and
oooonut oll markets.
3.1._ _ ___
The effects of the various policies discussed above can be eoneeptuall_"
illustrated in Figure _. For purposes of illustration, assume that: I) the
world demand for Philippine copra is perfectly elastic; (2) the producers zell
dlreotly to the exporter or domestic user; and (3) the export tax and the CCSF
levy, of which we further assume to have no ex_mptlons and evasions, are the
only relevant pOlIQiSS. S| is the margl_ml cost schedule in produoinK and
marketi_ copra, while S2 incorporates the per unit levy to this schedule. Dw
is the world d_and serve, while D_ reflects the ad valor_ export tax.
Finally, Dd is the domestic demand schedule for copra. The distorted
equilibrium is defined at the intersection of D_ and $2. The vertical dlstanee
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between P and P is made up of two components: i) the distancew
from Pw to Pu [user's price), representing the export tax; and
2) the distance from Pu to Pr, representing the CCSF levy.
Nominal protection rates (NPR) measure the policy-induced
wedge between border prices [Pw) and producer prices (Pr). In
the case of copra, this margin is primarily due to the export tax
(t) and the CCSF levy (f).7 Thus, if we define NPR as the pro-
portionate difference between Pr and Pw-
N_R= - (t + f).
Another policy that rm_y reduce prices received by producers
is the export ban. An export ban is equivalent to an export tax
equal to the difference between actual border price and the price
at which domestic supply equals domestic demand. This is illus-
trated in Figure 5. The export tax which would be just equivalent
to an export ban is b. Thus, our corresponding formula for the
case of export tax plus export ban is
NPR-- -(t + b)
7
Note _hat the levy, f, is here expressed as a percentage of the fob world
prioe: _ taxes omitted are the COCOFUND levy and the premium duty.
The former is roughly one percent of the border price of copra. Al-
though thslatter could be substantial, the exporters, nevertheless,
paid only 10 percent of it. The rest was paid out of the CCSF levy,
as provided in PD 414.
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Since b is not r.Jadily observable, it may be p_-oferable to estimate _P_
by dlrect_ oomparlng actual domestic and border prices. Care _hould be taken,
however, to control far effects of quality, looatlon and time [Hedalla and
Power]. Direct price comparisons also capture the effects of other policies,
which are difficult to incorporate formally, such as the effect of the
government' s marketJ.ng polio),.
If producer prices are subject to government controls, then NPH will
differ from the were induced by taxation as the government's marketing agency,
or Its equivalent, raises or lowers the |,rices ree_:ived by producers from
competltive levels. If the agency is a aono_s_ist, for
example, then it is able to collect marketing profits. Potential profits,
however, can be dissipated by government inefficiencies in ma_'ketlng.
Figure 6 illustrates how marketing proflts help to lower producer prices.
An additlorml curve Is introduced, the distorted marginal outlay schedule of
copra producers, 33 . The new distorted equilibrium is deflned at the
intersection of D_ and S3. The difference between P and P Is due to the
W r
export tax (represented by the distance PwPu ), the CCSF levy (RPr), and the
marketlr4 profits (P R).
U
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If the ion_-r,_n e]astxoi_y of w_'i,_ demano for Philippine copra is
finite, then im_os!t.g an expor_ tax, eq_al Lo the reciprocal of the elasticity
of worla d_and (Ed) fc_ Philippine coi_rar will increase efficiency. That is,
the country exploits its monopoly position thereby taking in addltlot_l export
receipts. Another way by which to capture these _onopoly profits from the
country's copra importers is by establishing a government marketing monopoly
for nopra, instructing it to maximize export profits. Whether such actions
increase efficiency depends on the wurld demand for Philippine c_covmt
products.
Econometric estimmte_ of Ed (Yelasco, 1975; Librero, 1971)8 tend to
underestimate long-term elasticities. First, long-term elasticities are larger
due to lags in changing habits and i_vestment required to u_ coconut oil
substitutes in manufacturing. In addition, ava11_b.le data _.a not appropriate
for estimating elasticities. Some part o.f trade re oresen_s the execution of
bilateral contracts, not activity in _ree markets. Furthermore, the contracts
may be tied to trade in other commodities or" to. pol._tical factors. Some of
these factors could potentlall.v change in res_)nse to attempts to change
prices.
The greater the substitutability between Pt_i_ppJ.ne col;ra and other
products and the less immutable are the l_litlcal factors imp_,g_Lng on trade,
the higher the el_stlolty, in the limit, if Phi_ipplne and other types of
copra are perfect substitutes, then the demand elasticity for Philippine copra
is equal to the wc_id demand elastlelty f¢_ copra divided by the P_ilipplnes'
8 For example, Velasco's estimates range from: copra 0.93 - 2.73; Coconut ell
0.52 - 2._10.
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market share.9 Given the relatively high substltutabillty between coconut oi]_
and other vegetable o$1s, as we saw in Figure 3 above, the long-run world
dem_;_d elasticity is likely to be quite large.
3._. _ r_e_mi_ _U_x o22eam_
The program aims to provide coconut-based consumer products such as
oooki_ oll to consumers at artificially low prices. By converting the volume
Of consumption for these products into their respective copra, equivalents,
through the use of standard conversion factors, we can analyze the entire
subsidy program in terms of copra. 10
Figure 7 illustrates this particular approach, if Pe is the price
i u
ceil£ng, then P allows the producers of the controlled consumer products t_ _arn
u
normal returns, while complying with the progr_. Domestic consumption wlll be
at Q . If the actual wholesale price, P , exceeds pt then producers lose by
o u u
the amount £ndlcated by the area P EDP m. They will be compensated exactly for
u u
thla out of the levy revenue, P IAP . Hence, the subsidy (S) is: S:(P -P_)Q .
U r u U 0
9 Thls ca_ be seen by the followlng:
dOW Pw dO Pw Op dQ Pw Oo
w ow dpw OWo Qwdpw Qw dPw Op
where P_ is the world copra price, and ow Q_, and Qw are respectively the
total w_rld demand for copra, tTJe world demand for _hillpplr_ and ot_;er
countries' copra.
10 Convertlng different units of different coco_t products in copra terms h_
been s common practice in the coconut industry. In fact, subsidy payments
are based upon the volume of domestic consumption _ copra ter_s of cookln_
oil, soap, and other coconut consumer product_ whose prices are subsidized.
The United Coconut Association of the Philippines (UCAP) provides an_
ocntlnuously updates a conversion factor m_trix for this purpose. See for
instance UCAP, 198'[. -_
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Table 5 gives our estimates of NP_ for coconut products from 1955 to
i981. The nature of the policies affecting copra producers prompted us to
present two estimates for copra. The first was calculated u_ing the formal tax
structure (NPRF) and the second was computed by direct price comparison
(NPRPC), the difference o£ the two we bad discussed In se0tion 3.1. We lumped
all processed products together under one estimate because they are affected by
similar policies.
_.I .I.
The Second col_tmn of Table 5 presents our NPRF estimates fcc copra. We
do not have entries from 1955 to 1969 since the export tax and the CCSF levy,
the policies considered in our NPRF formula, were introduced only in the last
decade. The NFRFs are all negative implying that copra producers have been
recelvlng negative protection from the two policies.
Looking at their period averages, the NPR_prlor to the imposition of the
CCSF levy in 1973 was - 8 percent. This became more negative, - 2_ percent,
from 1973 to 1979 reflecting the introduction of the levy. From 1980 to 1981
the NPP_fell further to - 29 percent, representing increases of the levy's rate
during these years.
For the 1970e, the average NPR_was - 2_ percent. This led us to conclude
that on account of the export tax and the CCSF levy, copra producers and
mld_lemen have been receiving, on the average, only 80 percent of.the border
prlca of copra.
We roughly verified this finding with our NPRPC estimates for copra sho_
by column 3. With the exception of the first, all entries are negative, again
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implying negative protection.
Table 5.
Nomlrml Protection Rates For Coconut Products: 1955-19811
(in percent)
Copra Processed Pr_duct_
Formal Tax Direct Price Formal Tax
Year Structure Comparisons Siructure
(N_F) (NP_PC) (NPRF)
1955- 1961 8
1962 - 1965 - 17
1966- 1969 - 5
1970 w 1972 - 8 __13 __6
1973 - 1979 - 2tl - 18 m =1
1980 " 1981 - 29 - 422 - 1
1955- 1969 - 5
1970 - 1981 - 21 - 22 -
l NPRs using the formal tax structure are reported in columns 2 and _.
For processed products, the relevant f_mal policy i8 the export tax. For
copra, the CCSF levy is considered in addition to its export tax. Since the
other processed coconut exports have the same export tax rate as coconut
oil, the N_Fe for the latter can be applied also for the former.
2 The rate reflects the UNICOH policy.
Source: Basic data drawn from the Central Bank, the Philipplne Coconut
Authority, the Bureau of Domestic Trade, and the United Coconut
A_oc£ation of the Philippines,
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The average NPRPC from 1955 _,e 196! 18 8 _ercent. 11 The pr_tectlon
system (via tariffs) wh$ch contlnued to overvalue the peso and the introduction
of the retention scheme in the the first half of the 1960s is suggested by the
average NPR of - 17 percent from 1962 to 1965. Exporters were _mnallzed twice:
(I) The dlst_rted exchange rate overvalued the peso; and (2) The exporters got
lees than this rate with the retention scheme. This implicit export tax
apparently was passed ca to copra producers creating the 17 percent wedge
between domestic and border prices.
With the liftlr_ of the retention scheme in the second half of the 1960s,
the average NPR £_ this perlod improved from - 17 percent to- 5 percent. 12
From 1970 to 1972, the average NPR deteriorated to- 13 percent clearly
re£lectlng the introduction of the export t,ax, Then, it got worse from 1973 to
1979, -18 percent, suuestlng the added imposition of the CCSF levy. What is
very interestlng was the dramatic fall of the NPR average from 1980 to 1981,
- q2 percent. Can this be attributed to the UNICOH policy?
Before we attempt to answer thi_, the average NPRPC in the 1970s was - 22
percent. This taillss very closely with the NPRF average of- 21 percent.
Despite the similarity between NP_PC and NPRF, there are two interesting
differences between the two estimates. First_ our NPRPC average is less
11 The use of the offlcal exchange rate that artiflcaily overvalues the peso
in convertlng the border price From units of foreign exchange to domestic
currency for pur_ses of price comparlson resulted in positive NPRPCs for
the second half of the 1950s.,
12 Thle margin is interesting because it should give us a rough estimate of
the marketi_ cost from the wholesalers' warehouses to the boats. To
illustrate, suppose we Just consider the average from 1967 to Ig69 alone
(assuming that the retention scheme w_s still reflected in 1966 prices),
the averse NPR was - _ percent (not shown in the table). Thus, marketing
costs were rou_y _ percent of the border price of copra.
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negative _han that of the NPRF during the period from 1973 to 1979. This came
as a surprise si_ce we expected otherwise on account of the other polieie_ a_d
marketlnE margins.
As an expla_atlon of this finding, copra supply was short of milling
requirements during two separate subperlods, 1973 to 1974 and 1976 to 1979.
Further_more, the subsidy program was operational since 1973. Our hypothesis la
_hat all mills were f_oed to operate at less than their respective capacities
because of the ehortaKe. The producers of the subsidized coconut consumer
products utilized the _adlng advantage provided them by the subsidy program
over the other millers. The producers bid up copra prices to increase copra
supply, operate at capacity, and increase profits. Thus, the NPRPCs f_ these
years were lees negative than the _JPRF.13
The second dlffereDce we noted is that the NP_PC average from 1980 to
1981 was 13 percentage points less than that of the NPRFs. Considering that
the UNICOM was alread7 operatio_l in this period, this dlfferontlal suggests
that ONICOM further depressed the price receive_ by copra producers. However,
we had almost the same picture _n 1975 (not shown by Table 5). In both periods,
there w_ a glut of _pra in the world market. Thus, it is difficult to
conclude for marketing profits on the basis of this finding alone. In fact, a
different apprOaCh is needed to measure ths eft'eat of marketing controls. This
la taken up in the next subsection. But before this, let us now turn to the
NPRs for processed coconut products.
.I.2. Processed Cgconut 22_9___
13 The ot_er mills mlght have surv_ved by helng more speculative in their
trading.
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Like copra producers, the oil millers, the dessicators and the
producers of other processed coconut products have also received
negative protection from the government. Based on the formal tax
str_cture, the average NPR for th_se products was - 4 percent for the
last decade due to the export tax. However, the figure is small
relative to the average NPR for copra, - 21 percent. This differ-
ence shows a strong policy bias for processed coconut products.
4.2. Estimating Marketing Profits
Considering that about 50 percent of coconut production is
exported as coconut oil, domestic wholesale prices of copra follow
very closely the price of crude coconut oil in New York. Figure 3
above confirms this observation, in practice, coconut oil exporters
base their buying prices of copra on the coconut oil price in New
York. The following is a schematic presentation of the theoretical
relationship between these two prices:
Price of crude coconut oil in New York ($/ib)
Multiply: 2,240 Ib/mt ($/mt)
Less: Freight and Insurance Costs (S/mr FOB)
Less: Export Tax a/%d Premium Duty on Coconut 0il (S/my .FOB after
tax
Multiply: Official Exchange Rate (P/mt FOB after tax)
Less: Crushing and Administrative Costs
Add= Value of Copra Meal Credit
Equals: Breakeven Price of Copra
Less • CCSF Levy
Equals: Domestic Price of Copra
Based on the above procedure, the "ten peso rule" has come to be used in
the oil milling, industry, It states that each. US cent per p_und af coconut oi
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in New York is equivalent to ten pesos per hundred kilos of copra in HanLla.
We estimated in Appendl.x I the average relationship between the price of
coconut oll in New York and the "border price" of copra in Manila. To get the
time serles of the latter, we added the export tax and the CCSF levy to the
actual price of copra in Manila. Thls procedure provided rough verification of
the ten peso rule.
To determine whether UNICOM extracted marketing profits from copra
producers, we used the rule to predict the border price of copra in Hanila,
Elven the price of coconut oil in New York in the UNIC_M years. We then
compared this predicted price (m_nus the relevant taxes) with the actual
wholesale price. The premium of the fcrmer over the latter was taken to be e
measure of Potential marketing profits. T_i_ approach assumes that competitive
market conditions existed before the UNICON period.
The calculations of the predicted price of copra are shown in Table 6
below. For 1980, the difference between the actual price in Hanl/a and the
predicted price we_ _45._2/100 kgs. copra. This was about 15 percent of the
predicted border price of copra. For 1981, the premium was @23.00/I00 k_s., oF
9 percent also ef the predlcted border price.
This result suggests that copra prices were depressed below their
competitive levels durlnE the first two years of UNICOH's operation. What is
not known, however, is whether the premiums we estimated constitute marketinE
profits or marketlnE _nef£1clencles. In either case, the UNICOH pollcy has
apparently contributed to lower domestlc prices of copra, thereby penallzln_
the copra producers even more.
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Table 6.
Predicted and Actual Copra Prices in Manila: 1980 and 1981
1980 1981
I. NY price of coconut oil
(US oents/ib) 30.00 25.00
2. Predloted border price of
copra in Manila
(_/100 kEs. copra) 300.00 250.00
3. Export Tax ($) 3.00" 0.00
4. CC3F Levy _
(_/100 kss. copra) 70.00 80.00
5. Predicted Manila price of
copra, after tax and levy 221.00 170.00
6. Actual Manila price of
copra 17 5.58 147,00
7. Difference _5._2 23.00
8. Percentage of difference
to predicted border price
of copra in Manila 15.00 9.00
weighted average
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Copra is the ma:.n input in prod_.cing coconut oil. The penalty provided
to its producers by the export tax, the CCSF levy and the UNICOM policy during
the last decade is a source of effective protection to coconut oll millers.
• 3. _ _ Rates _ 29_ fmco_u_ _ro_u0t8
Table 7 _tves our estimates of the EPRs for three coconut products,
copra, coconut oll (CNO) and dessicated coconut (DCN) from 1970 to 1981,
subd£vlded into t/tree eubperiods on the basis of policy reglmes. 14 We
estimated the input-output coefficients using the method described in Appendix
2. As mentioned above, copra is the major input for CNO, while it is fresh
coconut meat for DCN. The following are our findings.
14 Effective protection rates are discussed in this volume. Se_also Tan
[1979].
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Table 7.
_ffectlve Pro_eetion _._[te_for Coconut Products: 1970-1981
(in percent)
Outline of Effective Protection Ratesl
Policies Copra Coconut Oil Des sicated
Per led Coco nut
1970 - 1972 Export Tax - 8 + +2.3 - 7.0
1973- 1979 Export Tax, CCSF
Levy - 24 - 2.0 - 4.3
1980 - 198i Export Tax, CCSF
Levy, UNICOM - 29 42.0 18,4 O
* 1980 only
'I The maln inputs in the production Of coconut ell (CNO) and dessleated
coconut (DCN) are respectively copra and coconut meat. The corresponding
Input-output coefficients fur these were estimated using the method
•described In Appendix 2. For the other inputs, It was a_sumed that their
coefficients are fixed at: 7% for .CNO and 10% for DCN. The applicable
tariff far these was 10%. In the case .of copra, however, the tradab/e
inputs were negligible and were thus assumed to be zero. The ErRs reported
here are averages of estimated annual EPRs.
Source; Basic data •drawn from the United Coconut Association of the
Philippines and the Philippine Coconut Authority,
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-In oopra produQtlon, tradable, inputs are neglIEible. Thus, we t_,'eated
the total unit value of copra to be the unit value-added in copra production.
Aooordlngly, its EPR la equal to its NPR which needs no addltlorml discussion.
_.3.z. Y_mm_ o_z
Except fur the last subperiod, CNO miller_ had been receiving negative
effective protection. In the first aubperlod, their EPR was - 2.3 percent but
beom=e slightly lass negative fur the second subperiod, - 2.0 percent. Since
the CCSF levy had nothing to do with the market for CNO, it being a tax on all
the marketed copra, t_e first two subperlods in the Table had essentially the
same poli_ oonflguratlon- the export tax- except for the differential.
Beeall£n_ the previous discussion, the export tax rate on processed products
was two percentage points lower than that on copra. Since the copra/CNO
coefficient was 68 percent, the differential had mitigated the penalty a/ready
reoelved by the oll exporters from an export tax of about 4 percent. 15
The two-percentage-polnt differential failed to completely offset th*
export tax. But by widening the differential in 1979, the government started
to promote CNO production. In this year, the EPR was 0.9 percent (not reported
in Table 7). Thls explains partly the increase of the EPR from - 2.3 in the
first subperlod to- 2.0 in the second period including 1979.
Thls turnaround in policy from penalty to promotion .was even more dra_:.........
during the UNICOH years. The average EPR soared to a high of _2
15 In a. previous work, the EPR for CNO was estimated to be - 5 peFcent fo_
1974 [Tan]. Tan used the NCSO estimate of the input-output coefficient of
copra in CNO, which was 33 percent.
16 This is assuming that UNICOM did indeed collect marketing proflts from
copra producers, However, if the premiums that we estimated id the previo_
(Footnote continued)
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Percent. 16 Marketing profits in copra trading are additional sources of
protection for ell mill_s.
4.3.3. _ oc_
As An the case of coconut oll (CNO) millers, the desslcators had been
penalized with the e_,_rt tax. The EPR for DCN in the first subperlod was - 7
percent. It became less negative from 1973 to 1979, - 4.5 percent. Final&y,
we also observed that the EPR became positive, 11 percent t during the UNICOH
years. Coconut meat is the main input in DCI4 (about 45 percent of the total
value of DCN). Since it is mainly used to produce copra rather than DCN, it
shares the negative protection that copra suffered wlth the export tax and the
UNICOM, policy.
In this section, we present and interpret our empirical estimates of NPR
and ErR for oooonut produots. These indicators describe how the polloles
affecting the coconut industry have provided incentives and disincentives far
the production of the major coconut products. Of the policies we mentioned,
the CCSF levy has been shown to be the most important single policy in the
coconut industry. In the following •section, we will discuss the issues
pertinent to it.
5. _ £_g Levy
5.1. Revenue and sbu__tt
16(continued)
subsection were marketing inefficiencies passed on to copra producers, the
average ErR would still be - 2.3 percent.
-39-
The size of the revenue from the CCSF levy has been of central importance
in levy-related discussions. Because it is legally defined as private, the
government which collects it is not constrained to make this infcrmatlon
public. However, official figures about it get published occasionally [David,
1977; Busl_ss Day, 1980]o Based on the latest infarmatlon, the total levy
collected until the third quarter of 1980 is _5.815 billion [Business Day].
Ur_ertunately, the figures that were reported are cumulative revenues fur
perlods spanning several years. It may be mere instructive to have a picture
about the size of Its annual collectlo_. Table 8 attempts to provide It. The
estimates for the period _"om 1973 tlll 1976 were estimated in Clarete [1980],
based on David's report about the total colleetlon until the first quarter of
19_'7 [David]. Btartlng with 1977, the revenue was calculated as the product of
the applicable levy rate and the volume of production, assuming no evasion by
_opra users.
Thus, the total _ revenue until 1980 was about _7.316 billion
wlth the avera4_e annual collection o£ about _1 billlon. This is greater by
eI°5 blllAon than the mount reported in Buslr_ss Day. A possible explanation
• cr the discrepancy As levy evasions.
Table 8.
The CCSF Levy Revenue Estimate_: 1973-19801
Copra Produotion Applicable Revenue
Year Subjeot to Levy Rate (m111ion peso.q)
(million HT)2 (_/HT)
1973 - - 113
197_ -, - 1,024
1975 - - 695
1976 - - 765
1977 2.3 530 1,219
1978 2.4 600 1,400
1979 1.8 600 1,080
1980 1.q 700 980
I Estimates fo_ 1973 up to 1976 are from Ciarete (1980). Starting with 1977,
the estlmatoP ls: RevenueffiCopra x Levy ,rate (rounded to the nearest m:LZlion
pesoa),
.2 Three peroent of total produotion does not enter the market (Pounded to the
nearest hundred thousand. For 1980, the £iguPe is total cooonut exports in
eoprs terls. Adjustment wcs made to aco0unt for the _5 days in 1980 when
the levy was suspended,
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Table 9 shows how the lewj was allocated to its different uses since its
inception in 1973 till 1981, We distlnsuish seven maj.o_ uses of the levy: (1)
subsidy program; (2) premium du_y; (3) replanting program; (4) PCA development
program; (5) COCOFEDdevelopment program; (6) welfare progr_; and (7) Coconut
Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). The dlstrlbutlon of the levy rate bad been
changed eleven times. The last apportlor_ent may be regarded as typical
because it had the longest duration_
: BUs£_s8 Day [1980] reported total dlebursements made oF the levy revenue
Fr_ 1973 till the third quarter of 1980 (Table 10). About _2.2 billion or
about 37.8 percent of the total amount of the revenue, were deposited with the
UCPB f_ the replsnt£ng progr-_. Subsidy payments amounted to _1.5 billion, or
25.8 percent. Refunds to coconut fan_ers (or funds for the insurance progr_
for Coconut Fa_ers) totaled _563 m/lllon, or about 9.7 percent of the total.
The PCA rmoeived _567 m_lllon which it spent for its operatlons t research and
other Investments For the Industry,s development. The COCOFED got _309 m_llion
for its operations, scholarship program, and its other development projects.
The CIIF, which is managed by the UCPB, accumulated assets to _389 _tll£on.
Payments For the premium duty amounted to _5 ._llior_ The remaining _22
Ltll£on were expended on "operational costs, refunds of withholding subsidy and
short 1_, and bank charges H [Business Day].
Figure 8 describes the flow of the levy revenue from the coconut fanmers
up to the different agencies supervising its various uses, It is interesting
to note that the direct benefits from this levy to the coconut far_ers include
only the insurance program, the scholarship program and the subsidy program.
Based on the Busl_ss Day data (Table 10), the disbursements made £_ the
Table
8RF.AKD0YMOF LEVY RATESAND PERCT.NTAGESHAR[
(in Plc.k.)
f ( .......{ ..J Replanting Premium PC/_ j COCOFED WeTfare t ;i Subsidy Program , Refund Oev.eloJ:_nL ;, _velo_raent Proclram _ CI |F 1 DuraLion
1 ,",,ug. Io-oec. 14, 1973 15 I00 - - - 15 4
? _c. 15-Jan. 10. t974 25 100 ..... 25 2
:3 Jan. [i-r:a'./ Z1,, 1974 55 i00 - - -", 4
4 ,".ay 22-i_0V. 5, 1974 55 55 - 30 30 13 13 Z 2 - tOO 5
5 Nov. 6-Jan. If), 1q75 40 57 - !5 2? 13 19 2 Z ,"0
6 Jan. II-.Uay19, )975 5 12.5 20 50 )]: _'._ 2 5 4() 4
/ May 20-Sept. 19, I975 - 20 67 R 27 ? 6 - 3"._ 4
8 Sept. 20-Oct..3t, 1975 - 20 67 ; 7l. 2 6 I ¢ -: 3o 1 i
9 Nov. 1-Warc.h1'3,1977 Z _ 20 67 5 . },' 7 6 ! ,: _d t._ I,
I._ ;!_rch }9-A,m. l/. l_.77 ._2 53 20 3) C, ,_ _ 6 I / 6.,: "
;i A_fn.18-Sept. 9, 1981 12 ;C_ 2L3 33 : ._._ 2 3.5 1'_ _7 _: 13 ;,'_ ._)
SourcP: rCSF.
_,_._-
Table I0
DISBURSE_IENTS(I_F[HE ,.(.-F
g,alo_,nt
Item (bil]i_n l_cJs) Percent._..a
I. Replanting Program (CIDF) 2.2 37.8
2. Subsidy Program I .5 25,8
3. Coconut Farmer Refund 0,563 9.7
4. PCA 0,567 9,8
5. COCOFED 0,309 5,3
6. Coconut Industry Investment Fund 0,389 6,7
7. Premium Duty ().265 4,6
8 Miscellaneous 0,_22 0 _
TOTAL 5. _I 5 _00.0
Source: Business Da_, "Coconut Fund Nearing P5 Billion," September 1T9
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insurance program <.at %i_e It_ C_::c:_:::._._ar_::r.}I+:fund) _as onl?/ 9 [,ercel-_tof the
total levy revenue. 'ine 3chci_c'shlp...:_d ccnatitutea a t_hird of of t_;e
allooatlon 8,ive_ _o the COCOF£.5, which is about 2. [_ree_t of U_e e;nt;i_"e
revenue. 17 The subsidy progI_m accounted for about 25.8 {_reen_ of the levy.
A closer ioo_. 8& these returns re%'eals that they are contingent beliefits.
The benefit from the life insurance and the scbo].ar'?.hip prog_,_ms are contJ.__geut
respeetlvely upon their death _d the aeud_nic qualiflcat.ions of t/_.e_[r
children. Furthermore, they can only ber_el':[tfrom the subsJ.dy program if they
were consumers of coconut-based l)roduets, such as cookln_ oil.
5.3._ 22egr2a
The government a_ms to replant 60 {:_;:-eent of the country's coconut
plantations with a coconut hybri_I (a cross between the West African tall an.r{
• the Malaysian dwarf) by the year 2.020. Thj.s hybrid w_rlety is ai_lege4 to have
a higher yield in te,_s of nuts per tree and a shorter, _ies_;ation period th_{n
the predominant native variety. F_mding fc;,,-thi_. co_es _'rom the CCSF levy.
The contract to supply all the _eed nuts [.equiy'ed _ the p_og_ _.,'_
awarded by the Nat_o_Bl Investment _nd Dev-:iopment Corporation to A_rieultural
Investment Inc. (AII). All deVEloped 1,500 he_.'t_re_ in Bugsoc Island near
Palawano According to contract, the governmenl_ will buy all the ._eed nuts
produced by AII at _7,00 per nut aud will distribute them free to the far,nero°
These sale_ are exempted from taxation by virtue of I'D 582. In 1980, the
progrem wa_ supposed to be operatio_l.
Up to the present, ther_ is no evJdenc_ that the technology is widely
accepted by coconut farmers. Serious proDle_s may have prevented the progr_
17 The COCOFED had been given _3 out of every _60 of the levy revenue. _! out
of this was alloted for the scholarship prog_'_
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from taking off. One of these is the apparent reluctance of coconut farme_:_
to adopt the new technology.. The following might be an explanation of _is
problem.
The hypothesis that farmers are resistant to change appears to be
inconsistent with available evidence. Low-income farmers in a wide variety
of situations have been shown to adopt new technDlogy when it is profitable
to do so (Schultz, 1964; Ro_umasset, !976; Herdt and Mandac, 1981). The
farmers may be reluctant in adopting this hybrid because private benef!cs
of the new technology are less than the costs. The net benefits for this
hybrid may have been overestimated for several reasons.
1. The alleged benefit of this technology is its high yield. Yield
is measured in terms of nuts/trees. Unfortunately, the hybrid
nuts are at most two-thirds of the average size of the native
nuts. Thusu the yield advantage may have been overestimated.
For purposes of comparison, a measure of yield in terms copra/
t_ee should be used.
2. The hybrid has not been tested on a long-term basis for its
resistance to local diseases and pests. Expected yield of this
hybrid may not be as high as estimated from experimental growth.
3. As stated above, the hybrid nuts are smaller_ This implies that
there are additional husking costs in getting the same amount of
copra from these nuts.
4. Finally, a peculiar characteristic of this hybrid is that its
trees are shorter. _lis_n advantage as well as a disadvantage°
The advantage is that the costs of gathering the nuts from the
tree can be substantially reduced. On the other hand_ there may be
additional costs associated with preventing these nuts from being
stolen.
The rationale for this particular intervention in the form of taxing
farmers to make them replant a new variety are not clear. A superior coconut
technology is likely to be adopted eventually by ooconut farmers given ti_e
for it to prove its worth. A voluntar_ program, with modest incentives and
bette_ information might be the right approach here, just as in the case _f
adoption of new rice varieties.
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5.4. The Vertical Integration Progr _
The vertical integration program seeks to enable the coconut farmers
to go beyond their customary functions at the fan and become traders,
processors, and bankers, as well. The UCPB and _%e U_[COM, which con--
trols at least 75 percent of the country's rated milling capacity, repre-
sent the concrete embodiment of this pzDgram. Xn principle, the farmers
own the UCPB which in turns owns the UNiCOM.
An important issue in levy-related discussions is the ownership of the
UCPB. We recall that this bank was Purchased with levy revenue and that It_
shares were distributed by the PCA to the owners of COCOFUND receipts in _975_
According to a nationwide survey by the Ministry of Agriculture (Valiente et
al.), about 59 per cent of the sample of coconut farmers received the COCO-
FOND receipts, which became the basis in owning shares of the UCPB. Of these,
only 49 per cent registered them. Thus, the sample proportion, of farmers who
owned these receipts was about 29 per cent at the time of _e survey. About
18
35 per cent of those who had the receipts failed to register them. Even if
there was a
s icient campaign by the PCA to encourage all of those farmers to
register, the sample proportion of receipt owners would only be about 50 per
cent. Hence, these statistics suggests that only about half of the country's
coconut farmers could have equity in the UCPB_ Furthez_oze, they imply that
part of the UCPB equity that should have belonged to the farmers is owned by
some other individuals.
18 Registering the COCOFUND receipts with the C_OFED to_% chapter preside_t
or with the municipal treasurer establishes ownership of the receipts_
According to the survey, the remaining recipients gave the receipts to
their landlords or to the PCA.
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AS a group, farmers own 70 per cent of UCPB's total equity. The
remainder is held by the bank's former owners. In 1975, the bank's
aggregate resources was _706.5 million.
How much could a small coconut fam_er invest in the UCPB. Based on
1970 census figures (PCARR, 1980), the average size of a coconut farm for
the bottom 2/3 of all farms in 1971 was 2.4 hectares. Using 1980 productivity
and conversion figures, the average farm produces about 3.04 tons of copra
per year. This implies that the average farmer pays about P17 of COCOFUND
levy each year for which he is given a receipt. He could have accumulated
about P68 worth of COCOFUND receipts from 1972 when the COCOFUND levy was
imposed to 1975 when the UCPB was purchased. If he registerd and converted
these to UCPB shares, he could have invested about_04 in the bank.
with respect to the domestic trading of copra, UNICOM stands as the
largest single buyer. This could result in economic inefficiency if UNICOM
purchases copra at prices below competitive levels, with regards to equity,
this implies some income transfers from coconut farmers to UNICOM. In the
export trade, UNICOM becomes the sole exporter of coconut oil. Considering
its importance to the economy, there is s_e risk where foreign exchange
earnings depend solely on the goals of UNICOM and its skill in reading the
developments in the volatile fats and oils world markets. For example, if
UNICOMmistakenly thinks that it can extract long-run monopoly profits in
world trade, then it can do damage to the economy by attempting to act as a
monopolist. The high degree of substitutability in oils can frustrate attempts
to act like OPEC. Rather than bringing extra revenue to the economy, UNICOM
might damage the country's reputation as a reliable supplier of coconut oil and
in the long run undermine its share in the oils market.
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One arglm_ent for UNICOM i_ that the oil _illing industry could avoid
through the UNICOMa r_petition of what happened in 1979 wizen an acute
shortage of copra supply forced the millers to compete tightly among them-
selves. This led to wasteful procurement of copra as millers in Luzon
acquired copra from Mindanao, while those in Mindanao purchased copra in
Luzon. Unfortunately, the UNICOM policy, as a solution to the problem at
hand, had an unintended effect -introducing monopolistic practices in what
was essentially a competitive coconut oil milling business.
Another issue is the claim that the UNICOM policy promotes better in-
come distribution since it is owned by the coconut farmers. This arg_nent
is so%md if the program distributes its gains more to small than to large
coconut farmers. In principle, it is at least neutral to the intraindustry
distribution picture. On the other hand, the overall income distribution
picture improves if the program raises the incomes of coconut farmers in
general relative to the rest of the population.
we pointed out above that only about 50 percent of the coconut farriers
at most could have equity in the UCPB and thus the UNICOM. Even if the farmers
do indeed control the bank, it does n_t follow that they can be in a better
income position than before. They cannot exploit themselves. It is even
possible that they would be worse off as they pay for costs associated with
being in three sectors of the coconut industry - production, trading and
milling - simultaneously. Perhaps this raises a question about the entire
19
idea of vertical integration.
19 While economies of scale may be gained in integrating, it is more
likely, however, that the transaction costs to do it outweigh the
benefits, at least for the coconut industry, wherein the production
sector is made up primarily of small coconut farmers.
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6. Domestic Resource Costs forCo_a
6.1. Definition
The domestic resource cost (DRC) of a given exportable is the total
domestic social cost of a unit of its net foreign exchange earnings. _e
DRC is an index of comparative advantage at _e margin, i.e., it indicates
the relative efficiency of small changes in various production activities.
More precisely, the ratio of DRC to the shadow exchange rate (SER) indicates
comparative advantage only if it is less than unity (Pearson, et.al.).
In general competitive equilibrium, the marginal net social profitabi _
lities of all uses of domestic resources are all equal to zero. In the
absence of distortions, the DRC for each product will equal the equilibrium
exchange rate. With distortions only in product markets_ DRC expressed in
units of the foreign currency is just the effective protection rate plus one
(Krueger, 1972) 20 That is, the DRC is merely another indicator of the level
of protection (Bruno, 1972). If, however, there are also distortions in
factor markets, this simple relation between DRC and EPE does not hold.
_"_neDRC m_asure of comparative advantage is thus partly a reflection
of government policy. The DRC3 of a given product in different regions that
face the same policy should equalize. Moreover, differences in marginal
comparative advantage across products only reflects differential incentives.
20 This is only approximately correct since distortions in the product
markets can induce deviations in shadow prices of factors from market
prices (Sieper, 1981).
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Thus, we expect a cot/elation between DRC and EPR in any empirical work
(see e.g_, Bautista and Power, 1979). However, this correlation does
not imply that the government tends to protect inherently inefficient
industries. Rather this relation illustrates that at the distorted
equilibrium the opportunity cost to society of the resources drawn into the
protected sectors increases relative to the resource cost in unprotected in-.
dustries. In other words, the government is protecting inefficient product-
ion at the margin.
21
In this section, we calculate the DRC of copra _n 1976 of the main
coconut regions of the country; Southern Luzon, Mindoro, Central Visayas_
Western Visayas, Samar and Northern Mindanao. Following our discussion
above, we compare our DRC estimates first with the OER then with the SER.
First, we go over our input-output data and our shadow pricing proce-
dure.
6.2. Data
The data base comes mainly from th_ nationwide socio-economic and
marketing survey of coconut farmers, conducted by the Special Studies
Division of the Ministry of Agriculture (Valien_e, et.al.) This study
covered a sample of 2,850 farms and about 550 coconut traders distributed
accross ten regions in the country. _t teok three years (1975-1978) to
complete the survey.
Table ii gives some relevant economic info_aation from the survey. From
21 The DRC of processed coconut products _ere estimated for 1974 based
on the 1974 input-output table (_utista and Tecson). The estimates,
in pesos, are: Coconut oil 3.48
Dessicated Coconut 4.96
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the table, the survey w_-q conducted at different I_rlods, giving the problem of
standa_dlzlng the tlmlng of the information from each region. Thu'_, we
converted the values of land and capital invested in cocormt farmin_ to 1976
values using the impllolt growth rate of credit to the cocormt industry [see
PCARR, 1980]. More difficult to standardize was the coconut yield for each of
tbe regions. We replaced the yield inf_mmatlorl from the survey with the the
1971 to 1976 aversge of BAECON yield data for each of the regions.
A different problem concerned the treatment of missing values. Rather
than defining them to be zeros as what the sur%'ey report dld, we ign_ed them
in calculating averages.
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Table 11.
Some Econom:[c Information On
CQconut Farms, By _egion: 1976
(pez- hectare)
Southern Centrad Wee tern Nor thorn
Lumen MLindoro _isayaa Visayas S_ar Ft[ndanao
SSD Conducted In: 1976 1975 1977 1976 1975 1976
La bet Ut!1Izati on
(Mandays) I:
Planting 3.3 2.a 4.0 5.2 3.4 4.2
Fertilizing O.9 0.3 I.7 0.9 3- I 3.I
Weeding 5.8 4.0 4.2 3.9 4.8 6.3
•Hayvest_ng 12.0 11.6 1_,2 1_.2 11.0 " 10.8
Copra Making 7.3 9.5 13.5 7,3 8.7 11.3
Value of Land and
Invested Capttai2
... (pesos) :
Coconut Land 3,316.47 3,316.47 5,093.82 5,708.28 2,681.26 3,B21.90
Buildings 109.54 109.54 8_ .41 80 .i8 62.33 i25.07
Tools 41.75 41.75 10.88 14.20 71.52 30.61
Work Animals '220.09 220.09 • I09.12 202.37 266.23 226.65
Average Yield3
(1000 nuts) 3.0_4 3.014 a.48a 5.0_17 4.875 5.3J_I
Landlord share 0.60 0.50 0.70 0.77 0.7.5 0.80
1 in the SSD/MA cocoaut survey, missing values were implicitly defined as
zeros. In this table, they do not enter into the eal_ulation of average
mandays. When contract and non-contract mandays are reported f_ an
oporation_ total fc_- it is the wcJdghted average.
2 Non-1976 values were converted to 1976 figures using the Implloit growth
rate of oredlts to _ho eoco_mt industry.
3 The average yield from 1971 to 1976 in nuts per bearing tree was taken for
each region. This average was multiplied by the average number of be-_rlng
trees per •hectare (147) to get the average yield in nuts per hectare.
Source: Basle Data drawn from Special Studies Division and BAECON, Ministry of
A_Ioul ture.
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6.3. Shadow Pricing
Social Cost of Labor
For the shadow wage rate, we employed the Harberger method (B_way,
1975), which is essentially a weighted average of the marginal social cost
(MSC) and the marginal social benefit (MSB) of labor in copra production.
If the supply of labor is relatively elastic, then most of the additional
labor needed in copra production is met by an increase in supply. Thus,
the weight for MSC (d) will be close to one. The rest will come from existing
uses of labor.
We assumed that rural labor was homogeneous, and that its use in coconut
farms was substantial. The latter asstL_ption implies that distortions operating
in the copra market indirectly distort the rural labor market. The market wage
(W} was taken to be. the distorted MSB of labor. Thus, the undistorted MSB was
equal to (W/(I+NPR))_ where NPR is the nominal protection rate for copra. The
MSC was just equal to W. Formally, the Harberger shadowwage rate is
SWR = MSC (d) (l-d),
We assumed d to be 80 percent.
The total social cost of labor was determined by adjusting the cost
of hired labor upwards by 54 per cent to account for' the following: (a) house-
hold and operator's labor used up in production (50%) and (b) the interest
on labor's wages (4%).
Social Cost of Capital
The shadow interest rate used was 15 percent. The annual rate of
depreciation was calculated as the sum of one percent of the value of land and
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trees and ten _reent of the valse of inve_ted capital in coconut farms.
_le_1
The marginal aoelal value product of the land used in copra production is
the product of its marginal product and the world price of copra. The former
is approxi_mted bY the landlecd's share (s) multlplied by the average yield of
the land.
Roumaseet and james [1979] has _hown that s is an InereaslnE function of
land produot_vlty. In eases where s was not directly observed the followlnE
approximation was used:
(Yj- y')
_j = s' ............] (s*'- s')
(Y*'- X"}
where Oj is the landl_d's share in region j, Yj is the average land
produotlvlty of region J, and the superscripts * and ,e indicate respectively
the mi_Limt_ma_d max/mu_ values of the superscri|.,ted variable. Our mirdmum and
maximum shares are .55 and .80 respectively [_oumas-_et, 1979]. We adjusted
dOWtT_ard to ._0 the landlord share in Mindoro to account for the higher
marketing oost in th_Is province. The adjusted l_,downer shares are shown in
Table 11.
O_ver.atgr's _ _os_!
The total social factor" cost wa_ adJusted.upwards by 5 percent to
incorporate the.operator's opportunity cost _n copra production.
6.4.
Table 12 summarizes the domestic social costs in copra production. The
eoolal rent of land wa_ approx_t_ly 50_, the highest share of the entire
soolal cost of producit',_ copra. The _;badow wake bill was 25% of total Sooial
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cost. The opportunity cost of capital came third, at about 12%. The
combined cost of marketing, i.e., the total marketing outlay made by
farmers and traders, and of other inputs, both as reported in Valiente
et. al. (1979), constituted about 8% of total. The share of the operator's
opportunity cost of was about 5%. Land and labor costs together constituted
about three-quarters of the entize social cost. As expected, there was
little variation in the total social costs across the regions.
The average return per ton of copra in 1976 was $258.97. It is a
t_hree-year average centered at 1976. The average DRC was _6.05 with a
standard deviation of B0.14. Dividing the DRC with the OER which was
•7.44 in 1976, the average measure for comparative advantage was 0.81,
zoughly the protection coefficient for copra in 1976. The SER was 32%
over theOER in 1976. Thus, following the conventional practice, compa-
ratlve advantage averaged 0.55 for copra. That is, dividing the DRC with
the SER apparently suggests a stronger comparative advantage for all the
regions (0.55) than with the OER
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Table 12.
Domestic Re._ource Cost.q in Copra
Production, By Region: 1976
(per metric ton)
Southern Centr _I Western Northern
Luzon Mindoro Visay_s Visayas Samar Mindanao
Costs (pe)os)
Labor 513.57 505.37 416.69 293,55 360.07 332.32
Rent 726,30 653.67 847.97 932.52 908.29 969,22
Interest 75.68 75.68 27,35 35.27 49.23 _2.96
• Depreciation 94.43 94 ._3 63.68 68.75 54.82 41.2_
Others 6.19 2.04 7.15 3.98 7.33 6.21
Marketing 1I0.00 160.00 90.00 110.00 130.00 120.00
Subtotal 1526.17 1491.19 1452,84 1444.07 1509.7_ 1511,95
Operator 's
Opportunity.
Cost2 76.31 74.56 72.64 72.20 75,_9 75,60
Total 1602.48 1565.75 1525.48 1516,27 1585.23 1587,55
Returns (US $)3 258.97 258.97 258.97 258.97 258.97 258.97
DRC (pesos/US $) 6.19 6.05 5.89 5.86 6.12 6.13
Comparative Advantage_
DRCIOER 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.79 • 0.82 0.82
DRCJ SER 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.56
1 The Harberger shadow wage rate is used. The figures reported here are
corrected for household and operator's labor and for interest of the wages
to labor (54 percent of hired labor costs).
2 It Is estimmted at 5% of subtotal cost,
3 Three-yeay average of f.o.b, copra prices centered at 1976.
Assuming a shadow exchange rate of @!0.94 or 32 percent over the official
exchange rate (= _7.44).
Source: Baslo data drawn from the Special Studies Division, Ministry of
Agrlcalture and United Coconut Association of the Philippines.
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7. Con_cludln_ A___\k_s
The coconut levy and the expOrt tax d_kive a wedge between border and
producer prices. This wedge is apparently widened by pollcles which limit
¢ompetitlon with UNICOM. To the extent that UNICOH has market i_wer in buying
oopra, it Is able to _y lower prices to traders who in turn pay lower price_
to produoers.
The unified control of copra goes hand in hand wlth control of c_!
exports. To the extent that foreign exchange earnings to the Phiilppln_ are
increased, thls may partly be justified. But these earnings can be obtained
without monopolization. If we have some evidence that the elasticity of world
demand for coconut ell is finite, the country can impose, an export tax on oil
equal tO the reciprocal of the demand elasticity.
It is interesting to note that the govern;,_ent intervention Jn marketing
followed the intervention ,In investment• _nd pricing. First, the BOI investment
incentives were designed to offset existing distortions due largely to an
undervalued foreign exchange, that was in turn c_nlsed by a system of protective
tariffs. The government believed that the investment subsidy w;_s further
Justified by the backward linkages with t_e (_(.om_t industry. But the
incentives were nOt tied to any reasonable s_eciflc_tlon of millin_ capacity.
Thus, protection led to subsidies, which led to monopoly.
Another _use of unification was the price cow,trois on edible oils sold
for domestic eonsumptlon. As part of the res_latlon program, refiners of
edible ell were given a subsidy calculated to make up the difference between
the _c_ual copra price and the price necessary to "break even" given the price
controls on edible oil. Without the s,.,bsidy, refiners would reduce capacity
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utilization during tlmea of tight .copra supI_)ly. With the subsidy, however, Ib
beo_,-e profitable to malmt_in production at opti_al capacity even when copra
became scarce. Thla led to greater increases in wholesale copra prlees and
eorreapondlnE/y lowered the profitability of ell milling. Thus, when some of
the o11 mills closed down in 1979, the _overnment intervened with the UNICOM
policy. Again this illustrates bow a well meaning government intervention can
lead to a spiral of"offsetting regulations..
The UNICOM and the AII are examples of the tendency of government to
grant exclusive rights to a particular company. The government protects both
companies from compatltlon in their respective enterprl_s. Even the argument
that these companies are quasl-public enterprises in 'that they serve special
functions for government, programs in the industry is not sufflclent. It maybe
appropriate here to quote Baumoi's (1981) third p_inclple for the operation of
a public enterprise :
Unless an overwhelming ease in terms (,'fbenefits ear:
be. made for the contral,y [_sltlon !n a particular
case, a public enterprise _hould not be •protected from
the entry of competitors. Any firm which wlshea to
enter into eomp_tltlon with a public f_rm should
normally be permltted to do so without any s_eclal
costs.or obllgationa beyond those im[_t-ed on
incumbents. Moreover, freedom of exit should be the
rule, not the exception. In any •event, there should
always be a presumption that favors uuch freedom of
entry and exit, wltb the burden •of p1,oof to be borne
by those who wlsh to abrogate it _.n•any particular
ca_e (p. 11).
It appears that retaJ.nlng modest export taxes but r_oving the CCSF levy
and the trade restrictions would substantlal.ly increase returns _ coconut
producers while still providing a _.ubsldy to domestic consumers arid revenue:
wlth which to finance important development programs in the industry, e.g.._
research and development. For example, a, 12 percent export tax on both copra
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and coconut oil would automatically produce a price for domestic use that is
substantially lower than their border prices, thus eliminating the need for
the subsidy program.
If domestic price stabilization is desired, then the export tax should
vary with the world price. For the low world prices prevailing today, for
example, the export taxes could be removed. A variable export levy would also
tend to stabilize producer's incomes. It is interesting to note that the tax
would lower the mean prices to both producers and consumers, i.e., it would
imply a subsidy of consumers by producers. On the other hand, the average
z_turns to prod_cers would be much higher than under the present system. A
levy on agricultural exports may also provide more balance to the overall tax
system since non-agricultural producers tend to pay higher business taxes and
urban consumers pay higher indirect taxes relative to their real incomes.
This policy of increasing and stabilizing producers' prices would in turn
stimulate farm production. Historically, the major source of growth in coconut
production has been the expansion of area planted. Already 25 percent of the
cultivated area is devoted to coconuts, and we do not have evidence that
further expansion of coconut plahtations would be a better use of the country's
land resources than other crops.
This leaves us with the option of improving the present technology at our
coconut farms. However, increasing yields does not necessarily imply replanting
coconut plantations with a hybrid though this cannot be ruled out. A policy
to promote better farm management and to increase cultivation by intercropping
beneath the trees might be more efficient.
In summal-f, the export tax, production le%_], and marketing regulations
have all combined to lower the price received by coconut producers. Producers
have not been adequately compensated by the small and sBiective programs of
scholarship and insurance no_ by the replanting scheme. The consumer subsidy
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of cooking oll and other coconut products le also a very small _ansfer
compared to the tax revenue and potential marketing profits of government
regulated trade. While'the CCSF levy has been temporarily suapended, this ha_
been larsely offset by the recent imposition of an export ban on. copra again
resulting in substantial negative protection.
The real benefits to coconut consumers and producers could be financed
without either the CCSF levy o_ the export ban. A variable export tax would be
sufficient for the modest revenue needed for these pro_a_s and would provide
some degree of stabilization "and consumer protection as well. The export tax
should not be i_oreased_ however, without corresponding reductions in industrial
import tariffs which continue to impose hidden taxes on exports.
f|QO_Q
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Appendix ,I.
The RelationshAp Between The Prices oi"Crude Coconut Oil In New York
And Copra In Manila, 1970-1979: The "Ten Peso Rule"
Price of Price of Copra in .Ratio of Manila
Coconut Oil " Manila, Gross of Copra Price to NY
in New York Export lax and Levy Price of Coconut O£L
Year (US oent_/Ib) (9/100 k_:s.)1 (ool.3/ool.2)
(I) (2) (3) (4)
1970 14.40 105.60 7.3
1971 12.50 97.60 7.8
1972 9.05 72.80 8.0
1973 21.30 194.40 9.1
1974 45.03 386.70 8.6
1975 17._5 156.30 9.0
1976 18.57 179.00 9.6
1977 25.92 272.20 10.52
1978 30.66 323.50 10•52
1979 43.85 "438.50 10.02
1 The expor_ tax alldthe CCSF levy are added to actual copra price An Manila.
This series may be •regarded as the copra price in the absence of the export
tax and the CCSF levy or the "•borderprice" of copra.
2 The "ten pesO rule" ia evident starting 1977-
Souroe: Baslo data drawn from the Un/ted Coconut AssocAation of the
Philippines.
-63-
Appendix 2.
)
E_imatlng The Input-Output Coefficient of Copra and Coconut Meat
In _oconut Oil and Dessicated Ccconut
i. Copra-Coconut Oil Coefficient
a. Conversion Factc_ s
i) 0.63 m.t. coconut oil per m.t. copra
il) 0.31 m.t. copra meal (a by-product in milling) per m.t. copra
b. Copra-Coconut Oil Coefficient
i) •1.587 m.t. copra x Price of m.t. copra = Value of gross copra per
m.t. coconut oll = Vc
ii) 1.587 m.t. copra x 0.31 m.t. copra meal x Price of
m.t. copra meal = Value of Copra that went into Qopra meal
per m.t. coconut oil = Vcm
ill) Thus, Copra-Coconut Oil Coefficient = (Vc _ Vcm)/Prlce of
m.t. coconut oil.
2. Coconut Meat-Dessloated Coconut Coefficient
a. Conversion Factors
l) 0.222 m.t, copra per 1000 nuts
ll) 0.162 m.t. desslcated coconut per 1000 nuts
b. Coconut meat-Desslcated coconut coefficient
i) Price of m.t, coconut meat - Price of m.t. copra - Processing
Cost of m.t. copra
ll) Processing Cost of m,t. copra - 0.30 x Price of m.t. copra _
Ill) 0.222 m.t. copra per 1000 nuts x 0,70 x Price of
m.t. copra = 0.1554 m.t. coconut meat per 1000 nuts x Price of
m.t, copra = Price of _.t, coconut meat per 1000 nuts = Vm
iV) 0._62 m,t. deaeicated coconut [_r 1000 nuts x Price of "
m.t. dessloated coconut = Value of desslcated coconut per
1000 nuts = Vdcn
V) Thus, coconut meat-dessicated coconut coefficient = Vm/Vdc n =
0.96 x (Price of m.t. copra / Price of m.t. desslcated coconut).
,@_-
•Appendlx 2 Continued
3, Estimates:
CopPa-Coconut 0£I Coconut Meat-Dezslcat_d
Tear Coefficient Coconut Coefficient
1970 0.78 0._7
1971 0.78 0._14
1972 0.70 0,36
197_ 0.72 0.56
1974 0.65 o.sg
1975 0.52 0.38
1976 o.61 0.43
1977 0.69 O,43
1978 0.70 0.42
1979 0.76 0,45
1980 0.63 0.31
1981 0.65 ,
, by assu,._lon.
_ no data.
-_ouroe: Converstlon factors drawn from the United Coconut Association of the,
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